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Abstract
Industrial renewal in the bio/nanopharma sector is important for the long term strength of the
Australian economy and for the health of its citizens. A variety of factors, however, may have
caused inadequate attention to focus on systematically promoting domestic generic and small
biotechnology manufacturers in Australian health policy.
Despite recent clarifications of 'springboarding' capacity in intellectual property legislation, federal
government requirements for specific generic price reductions on market entry and the potential
erosion of reference pricing through new F1 and F2 categories for the purposes of Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme (PBS) assessments, do not appear to be coherently designed to sustainably
position this industry sector in 'biologics,' nanotherapeutics and pharmacogenetics.
There also appears to have been little attention paid in this context to policies fostering industry
sustainability and public affordability (as encouraged by the National Medicines Policy). One notable
example includes that failure to consider facilitating mutual exchanges on regulatory assessment of
health technology safety and cost-effectiveness (including reference pricing) in the context of
ongoing free trade negotiations between Australia and China (the latter soon to possess the
world's largest generic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity). The importance of a thriving
Australian domestic generic pharmaceutical and bio/nano tech industry in terms of biosecurity,
similarly appears to have been given insufficient policy attention.
Reasons for such policy oversights may relate to increasing interrelationships between generic and
'brand-name' manufacturers and the scale of investment required for the Australian generics and
bio/nano technology sector to be a significant driver of local production. It might also result from
singularly effective lobbying pressure exerted by Medicines Australia, the 'brand-name'
pharmaceutical industry association, utilising controversial interpretations of reward of
pharmaceutical 'innovation' provisions in the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA)
through the policy-development mechanisms of the AUSFTA Medicines Working Group and most
recently an Innovative Medicines Working Group with the Department of Health and Ageing. This
paper critically analyses such arguments in the context of emerging challenges for sustainable
industrial renewal in Australia's bio/nanopharma sector.
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Background
Australian pharmaceutical exports were A$1.77 billion in
1999–2000 and approximately 14,000 people were
employed in the industry. By 2003, Australia was export-
ing $1.96 billion in pharmaceutical products, but import-
ing $4.4 billion (of which 45% derived from firms of US
corporate nationality). None of the top ten pharmaceuti-
cal firms (by sales volume) was Australian [1]. It is
unlikely in the foreseeable future, chiefly because of the
scale of investment required, that large scale Australian-
owned 'innovative' or research-oriented pharmaceutical
companies will become a sustainable proposition.
This sanguine conclusion and impending patent expiries
over high sales revenue ('blockbuster') medicines, should
have spurred Australian government policies for system-
atic industrial renewal, paying careful attention to sup-
porting the generic pharmaceutical sector (understood as
the conditions for supply of generic medicines in Aus-
tralia). Such reforms could reasonably be expected to have
positioned that sector favourably in relation to challenges
like those concerning biologic products, nanotechnology
and pharmacogenetics. As this article attempts to show,
such systematic regulatory reforms have not eventuated.
Instead, the Australian generics industry has reacted with
dismay and anger at many recent government policies,
developed after relatively low levels of consultation and
with little apparent appreciation of the long term chal-
lenges for medicines policy in Australia [2]. This article
complements that of Lofgren in this series, by exploring
the factors influencing, and the consequences of, this pol-
icy oversight regarding Australia's emerging biotech/nan-
otech sector, as well as the importance in that context of
reference pricing as a means of promoting markets genu-
inely competitive for public health outcomes as well as
sustainable profits.
Australia's Generic Pharmaceuticals Policy in a Global 
Context
Worldwide, generic pharmaceutical manufacturers com-
prise a large segment of the global pharmaceutical indus-
try, and are collectively expanding at a faster rate than the
so-called 'innovative' or 'brand name' sector, as a conse-
quence of systematic regulatory encouragement, mergers
and acquisitions, as well as the growth of a new market for
'biosimilars' [3]. Generics sales (in the top eight national
markets) in 2005 were about US$55 billion, which repre-
sents about one tenth of the total global prescription drug
market [4]. A UK-based business forecaster has predicted
the Australian generic pharmaceuticals market, with
appropriate regulatory support, should have doubled in
value to $2.4 billion a year by 2009 on the back of three
per cent rise in market share from the current estimate of
12.8 per cent.[5] As we shall see, for a variety of structural
and regulatory reasons, such estimates now likely to be
more conservatively revised.
Under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) cost-
effectiveness reimbursement system, as it operated
between the late 1990's and 2004, Australian generic
pharmaceutical firms competed not on PBS price, but for
deals with retail pharmacists (by offering convenient sup-
ply arrangements and, most significantly, large discounts,
in the order of 30% or more). They also benefited (as did
the Australian public and Federal government) from the
process of reference pricing and cost-effectiveness assess-
ments involved in the Australian PBS listing process. This
ensured the public relatively favourable prices for 'brand-
name' medicines, but permitted slightly higher prices for
generics, compared to the US and some other developed
countries [6]. Claims that the PBS prevented generic sup-
pliers engaging in price competition were exaggerated and
misleading [7]. The PBS has unquestionable democratic
legitimacy. It is one of the few pieces of public policy in
Australia that has been approved in a Constitutional refer-
endum by a majority of citizens in a majority of States. It
has survived challenges to its implementing legislation in
the High Court of Australia and been improved by a series
of federal governments over more than fifty years of
intense health policy debate [8].
The core regulatory component of the PBS system is sec-
tion 101 (3A&B) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth).
This, in broad terms, requires that pharmacoeconomic
experts on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Commit-
tee (PBAC), can only recommend PBS listing of a pharma-
ceutical submitted by its manufacturer after a positive
determination of its cost-effectiveness in relation to alter-
native therapies (whether or not involving drugs). If the
submitted product is proven to be substantially more
costly than such comparitors, then a significant improve-
ment in efficacy or reduction in toxicity has to be estab-
lished to justify listing. This provision provides the
legislative basis for reference pricing under the Australian
PBS.
Reference pricing is a central component of the basic
architecture of the PBS system [9]. When cost-effective-
ness analysis has determined that a new patented drug
seeking PBS listing provides no greater efficacy or safety
than is appropriate comparitor, then an exercise of cost-
minimisation begins in which its price is 'referenced'
down to that of the comparitor. Reference pricing thus is
an evidence-based mechanims for accountably and trans-
parently valuing pharmaceutical innovation on grounds
of objectively demonstrated therapeutic significance [10].
Prices of all drugs in such a group are tied to that of the
lowest, or in some cases the average, price [11]. This does
not necessarily mean that the reference price becomes theAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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market price for all drugs in the same therapeutic class,
rather the reference price becomes a benchmark [12].
Manufacturers can set prices higher than the reference, but
in doing so they need to genuinely compete in the open
market against equivalent lower priced medicines. This is
one reason why it is inaccurate to say that reference pric-
ing inhibits competition on price. The resultant expert rec-
ommendation may allow the creation of either positive or
negative lists for government reimbursement of pharma-
ceutical prices [13].
Between 1990 and 2004, a succession of Australian gov-
ernments funded a variety of regulatory initiatives, to
obtain greater public benefit from the PBS system, phar-
maceutical R&D and the generic pharmaceuticals sector.
Reference pricing and the capacity it gave government
reimbursement to value innovation scientifically against
criteria of objectively demonstrated therapeutic signifi-
cance, was central to capacity of these policy initiatives to
fulfil the core elements of the Australian National Medi-
cines Policy. These reflected a fair balance of all stake-
holder concerns:
1. timely access to the medicines that Australians need, at
a cost individuals and the community can afford;
2. medicines meeting appropriate standards of quality,
safety and efficacy;
3. quality use of medicines; and
4. maintaining a responsible and viable medicines indus-
try [14].
One Australian pharmaceutical industry initiative
involved the minimum pricing policy, introduced in
December 1990. This encouraged patients to switch from
innovator brands to corresponding generic products. The
effect, however, was marginal, since pharmacists could
only dispense the brand prescribed by the doctor, and the
average surcharge or brand premium was only about $1
per prescription. Brand substitution by pharmacists was
introduced on 1 December 1994, when generic medicines
constituted only 2% of PBS expenditure. This policy
allowed supply of less-expensive generic medicines at the
request of the patient, regardless of which brand the doc-
tor had prescribed. In February 1998, the government
introduced the therapeutic group premiums scheme
(TGPs). Its objective was to introduce greater competition
into the pricing of medicines judged to have an equivalent
therapeutic effect, even though they were not identical
chemical compounds. The availability of cheaper generics
was then supposed to have flow-on positive effects in
decreasing PBS reimbursement of all products in such
groups (despite the extent of brand premiums).
On 29 May 2001, the then Minister of Industry, Tourism
and Resources announced a Pharmaceuticals Industry
Action Agenda with an Implementation Group under the
Chairmanship of Dr Graeme Blackman. Its key policy rec-
ommendations were to "promote increased investment
and exports of pharmaceuticals goods and services"
(action 2); "identify opportunities and facilitate growth in
the export of pharmaceuticals industry" (action 7) "pro-
mote two-way movement between industry and
academia" (action 11) and "align industry activity with
the National Innovation Awareness Strategy" (action 14)
[15].
As part of this Action Agenda, and following on from sim-
ilar programs dating from the late 1980s, the Department
of Industry, Tourism and Resources between 1999 and
2004 operated the $300 million Pharmaceutical Industry
Investment Program which rewarded manufacturers
undertaking research and development in Australia. This
program channelled support to nine companies, includ-
ing one generics firm, FH Faulding & Co Limited (subse-
quently Mayne Pharma) [16]. It was replaced from 1 July
2004 by the Pharmaceuticals Partnerships Program worth
$150 million over five years.
These policies focused on subsidising research and devel-
opment and not on making the types of structural and reg-
ulatory changes that would support the sustainability of a
sustainable Australian generic pharmaceutical industry
linked by incentives to nano/biotechology companies
and increased science education infrastructure. Crucial to
such sustainability is a system of high rewards for genuine
innovation objectively demonstrated by expert compari-
son of outcomes on core clinical indications against all
competitors. PBS reference pricing provides this high
reward for success in true competition on a level playing
field. These policies, in retrospect, paid insufficient atten-
tion to supporting and developing PBS reference pricing
as both a fiscal lever over patented drug prices and a
means of developing a sustaining local pharmaceutical
industry capable to responding to public health demands
and encouraging employment amongst our best science
and chemistry graduates.
Australian Generics Policy and Reference Pricing After the 
AUSFTA
2004 was a pivotal year for Australian generics medicine
policy. That date marked the signature and subsequent
entry into force (on 1 January 2005) of the pharmaceuti-
cals-related provisions of the Australia-US Free Trade
Agreement (AUSFTA). Particularly important in this con-
text was the potential for manufacturers of patented phar-
maceuticals (through agencies such as an AUSFTA
Medicines Working Group and carefully staged confer-
ences on the future of the PBS) to lobby for or against Aus-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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tralian medicines policies, relying on the trade sanctions-
backed Annex 2C.1 principles (for example, reward of
pharmaceutical 'innovation') and article 17.10.4 of Chap-
ter 17 (introducing so-called 'linkage evergreening,' as
explained in another paper in this series). Since that time,
it appears to have been very difficult for the Australian fed-
eral government to develop policies that would facilitate
the growth of a high value-added generic pharmaceutical
sector. It also seems to have been more difficult for gov-
ernment to resist the policy demands of the 'brand-name'
drug industry, particularly those in relation to 'eliminat-
ing' reference pricing. Of even greater concern, is the pos-
sibility that the Australian government struck a covert deal
during the AUSFTA negotiations (in contradiction of its
public assurances), to subsequently remove PBS reference
pricing. Such an allegation is controversial, nevertheless,
is easily countered by continued government support for
reference pricing as a valuable fiscal lever over the expand-
ing costs of patented pharmaceuticals.
Supporting such an hypothesis was a Conference Agree-
ment on the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and
Modernization Act 2003 (US) which obliged the United
States Trade Representative (USTR), the Secretary of Com-
merce, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
analyse:
whether bilateral or multilateral trade or other negoti-
ations present an opportunity to address...price con-
trols and other such practices and ...shall bear in mind
the negotiating objective set forth in the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 to achieve the
elimination of government measures such as price
controls and reference pricing which deny full mar-
ket access for United States products. In so doing, the
agencies shall provide periodic and timely briefings
for the Committees of the House and Senate listed
above, with an interim briefing no later than 90 days
after enactment to address negotiations to establish a
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement and, as appro-
priate, other current negotiations [17]. [emphasis
added]
Prior to signature of the AUSFTA, Australia's chief negoti-
ator went on record before a Commonwealth Senate
Select Committee on the AUSFTA, as stating that the
agreement had merely preserved the status quo in areas
such as patent terms, data protection, market entry after
patent expiry, compulsory licensing, parallel importation
and intellectual property harmonisation [18]. He admit-
ted that article 17.10.4 did require legislative change by
Australia, but disagreed with the submission of the Aus-
tralian Generic Medicines Industry Association (GMiA),
in denying those provisions were intended to promote
'evergreening' of brand name pharmaceutical patents.
Most importantly, in relation to the PBS and the AUSFTA
Annex 2C provisions he stated:
We went into these negotiations with an absolutely
clear mandate to protect and preserve the fundamen-
tals of the PBS. This is what this agreement
does...There is nothing in the commitments that we
have entered into in Annex 2C or the exchange of
letters on the PBS that requires legislative change
[19]. [emphasis added]
Australia's senior negotiator on the AUSFTA PBS pro-
visions, likewise stated:
I would like to reinforce what Mr Deady has said, in
that the [AUSFTA] PBS text-annex 2C and the associ-
ated exchange of letters-entirely preserves the funda-
mentals of the listing and pricing mechanisms of
the PBS...The principles that are articulated in para-
graph 1 of Annex 2C...do not convey any specific obli-
gations on the parties and they are indeed consistent
with the current principles and practices underlying
the operation of the PBS...They do not prevent the
continued priority being accorded to fundamental
principles that are articulated in our national drug pol-
icy [National Medicines Policy], particularly in rela-
tion to affordable and timely universal access to
medicines, innovative or otherwise. They do not pre-
clude the continued recognition of the importance of
public health as encompassed by Doha paragraph 6
[World Trade Organisation Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health]...The text of the agreed principles in
[Annex 2c.1(d)] states: The need to recognise the value of
innovative pharmaceuticals through the operation of com-
petitive markets or by adopting or maintaining procedures
that appropriately value the objectively demonstrated ther-
apeutic significance of a pharmaceutical. That text is spe-
cifically intended to reflect two systems...It was purely
intended to reflect the US system in the reference to
the competitive market, and in the reference to adopt-
ing and maintaining procedures that 'appropriately
value the objectively demonstrated therapeutic signif-
icance,' it was intended to reflect the Australian system
as it currently exists. The understanding was that the
agreed principles were entirely consistent with the
operation of the PBS in its current form and do not
oblige us in any way to change the way in which we
operate [20]. [emphasis added]
Yet, other evidence before the same Senate Committee
expressed concern for the survival of the Australian
generic pharmaceutical industry in the changed regulatory
circumstances likely to arise as a result of the AUSFTA
[21]. Valuing of 'innovation' as a policy principle was
emphasised at the first meeting of the Medicines WorkingAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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Group (MWG) in Washington DC in January 2006. Aca-
demic commentators argued, however, that 'valuing of
innovation' was really an industry lobbying principle that
needed to be far more thoroughly tested by democratic
processes before it could be allowed to drive health policy
in Australia. More public and stakeholder debate was
needed on the definition of 'innovation' and how it
should best be transparently and accountably measured.
Extensive debate was also needed on its coherence with
the existing principles of National Medicines Policy [22].
Certainly the Australian generic pharmaceutical industry
was not as systematically consulted with and supported
by the Australian AUSFTA negotiators, as was the multina-
tional patented pharmaceutical industry by their US coun-
terparts [23]. Many provisions in the AUSFTA, particularly
those in Ch 17 introducing 'linkage evergreening,' extend-
ing patent terms for delayed marketing approval and
restricting compulsory licensing, directly opposed the
interests of Australian generics manufacturers and Austral-
ian public health. Of great concern would be whether the
reference to valuing for 'innovation' in Annex 2C.1 of the
AUSFTA was negotiating code for an agreement to facili-
tate the explicit agenda of US negotiators in breaking the
PBS reference pricing link between innovative products
and generic medicines.
On 1 August 2005, without consulting the Australian
generic pharmaceutical industry (as it subsequently
acknowledged), the government imposed a 12.5% man-
datory cut in the benchmark price when a generic was first
launched within a particular therapeutic class. It
announced (in words that mirrored the those of Medi-
cines Australia) it would like to achieve PBS savings by
further cutting the profit margins of generic drugs, to
allow 'headroom' for reimbursement of new, expensive,
'brand-name' (or 'innovative') drugs [24].
Article 2C.2(e) of the AUSFTA had required the selective
promotion of transparency in Australian PBS listing proc-
esses (industry commercial-on-confidence claims were
excepted). Annexes in trade agreements are designed
apply to one party, rather than creating mutual obliga-
tions (although the principles of Annex 2C.1 explicitly
create mutual obligations). This AUSFTA Annex 2C.2(e)
obligation, however, was broadly in accord with Aus-
tralia's National Medicines Policy [25]. In fact, it provided
the impetus for the creation of the valuable Public Sum-
mary Documents (PSDs) providing community informa-
tion on the outcomes of pharmaceutical company
submissions from the July 2005 PBAC meeting. PSDs are
likely to become valuable means whereby PBAC processes
involving 'objectively demonstrated therapeutic signifi-
cance' become recognized as the most efficient means of
assessing the public value of innovative pharmaceuticals
in a genuinely competitive market.
This start date for PSDs, however, conveniently post-dated
Pfizer's successful immediate post-AUSFTA PBAC submis-
sion concerning its 'blockbuster' anti-cholesterol drug Lip-
itor (atorvastatin). Pfizer's application, in any event, was
to change atorvastatin's PBS listing status from cost-mini-
misation (involving reference pricing because no clinical
outcome advantage had been proven against the compet-
itor simvastatin) to cost-effectiveness involving a price
premium, so avoiding reference pricing and the generic
12.5% reduction. This was successful despite the fact that
the PBAC noted that there were no head-to-head trials
comparing atorvastatin against simvastatin, which meas-
ured hard outcomes like cardiovascular events, rather
than surrogate markers such as changes in cholesterol lev-
els [26]. Some members of the PBAC subsequently
expressed concern about unusual departmental pressure
concerning this decision [27]. In the author's opinion, the
context and outcome supports the fact that the Lipitor
decision had some connection with US AUSFTA negotia-
tor demands that the Australian government trade off ref-
erence pricing, or begin to value innovation more through
the vague standard of what they term the 'operation of
competitive markets', although an equally valid hypothe-
sis is that a variety of other industry lobbying forces were
at work. The success of such pressure, should it be proven,
if in any way influential in the ultimate decision, repre-
sents a serious beach of the integrity of PBAC processes
and Australian health policy development.
After the AUSFTA, the Australian government pro-
pounded a variety of draft medicines-related policies for
public and stakeholder discussion. These included: (1)
Preferred prescribing to ensure that patients always have
access to medicines at no more than the co-payment. (2)
A two year phase-in for flow-on reference pricing changes
for patented drugs that would allow sponsor companies
to further demonstrate their cost-effectiveness. (3) Com-
pensation to pharmacists for changes to pharmacy
income flowing from the impact of policy change on the
PBS. (4) Disclosure by manufacturers of the actual price at
which drugs are sold. (5) A mandatory 5 per cent price cut
for new generic medicines that are listed on the PBS (as
well as the existing mandatory 12.5 per cent cut for the
first new generic in any reference pricing group). These
proposals were set in the context of continuing support
for gradually strengthening the capacity of the PBAC cost-
effectiveness process to assess the offered price for innova-
tor drugs relative to both modeled or disclosed marginal
cost of production and community value based on objec-
tively demonstrated therapeutic significance in post-list-
ing assessments [28].
In 2005–6, the Australian Federal Government joint
Treasury, Industry and Finance Committee also devel-
oped draft policies which included a tender system for theAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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supply of off-patent medicines to the PBS. This option
involved the 'winning' manufacturer(s) being able to offer
the drug to patients at a significantly discounted co-pay-
ment of up to 50%. It also required that PBS reimburse-
ment accorded other drugs in the same therapeutic class
be reduced to match the price offered by the winning ten-
derer, who alone could offer the drug at a reduced co-pay-
ment. A related proposal granted the winning tenderer six
months of reduced co-payments against therapeutic com-
parators. At the end of this period, any manufacturer offer-
ing the reduced price would also be able to offer patients
the discounted co-payment [29]. Estimated PBS savings
resulting from these various proposals was between $300
and $800 million a year [30]. Yet, none of these policies
was implemented and the suspicion is that they were
merely bargaining chips.
Also in the mix were proposals drafted on behalf of pat-
ented, allegedly 'innovative' pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers in Australia through their lobby organisation
Medicines Australia. These involved limiting market com-
petition the market place so that brand name pharmaceu-
ticals could be listed in a category which did not allow
them to be reference priced against generic competitors
that were interchangeable at the clinical level [31]. One
such suggestion allowed the PBS system to pay less for a
generic medicine every time its sales increased by a set per-
centage. Others required generic manufacturers to com-
pete for the right to a period of market exclusivity [32].
The most extreme policy position taken by Medicines Aus-
tralia involved eventual replacement of the PBS with indi-
vidual consumer medicines savings accounts [33]. The
path to such an outcome will not be a short one but is
likely to be paved with rubble from the dismantling of ref-
erence pricing and the resultant increasingly high and
unsustainable PBS costs for patented pharmaceuticals,
whose claims to innovation remain untested against evi-
dence-based criteria of objectively demonstrated thera-
peutic significance against all market competitors.
The AUSFTA MWG met for the first time in Washington
on 13 January 2006. At this inaugural meeting Australia's
Trade Minister Mark Vaile stated:
"The core principle that we both agree on in this area...is
recognising the value of innovation [34].
Documents about this AUSFTA MWG meeting were
obtained under a Freedom of Information application
[35]. They reveal that the first AUSFTA MWG meeting dis-
cussed only one Op-Ed and that included this statement:
"Truly innovative cures should be referenced against inno-
vation in other classes, rather than against generics."[36].
Reference Pricing and the PBS F1-F2 Changes
Late in 2006, the Federal Minister for Health announced
the final version of this round of PBS reforms. This
endorsed what was, in substance, the Medicines Australia
policy proposals for a new stand-alone (F1) classification
in the PBS for non-clinical interchangeable medicines.
The minister announced:
First of all, we are dividing drugs on the PBS into two
categories – Formula 1 and Formula 2. Formula 1
drugs will essentially be drugs on patent, drugs for
which there is a single brand. Formula 2 drugs are
essentially drugs off patent, drugs for which there are
multiple brands. Now reference pricing arrange-
ments, as they have traditionally operated...will not
operate in F1....[22] [emphasis added]
The National Health Amendement (Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme) Bill 2007 proposes to add new sections 85AB,
85AC to the National Health Act 1953 (Cth). These fracture
the unitary PBS formulary into two: F1 for patented or
allegedly 'innovative' medicines and F2 for generic medi-
cines. Price cuts and disclosures will be imposed only on
F2 generic medicines (new Division 3A of Part VII). Refer-
ence pricing will be limited to a few existing F1 therapeu-
tic groups, or to where they have been established on the
imprecise standard that comparitors are 'interchangeable
on an individual patient basis' (proposed sections 84 AG
and 101 (3BA)). There will be no ongoing reference price
links between medicines listed on F1 and those listed on
F2 [37].
The new F1 category represented a fundamental challenge
to the integrity of PBS reference pricing. The extent to
which the inability to 'reference' the price of F1 to F2 drugs
and the precondition of 'interchangeable on an individual
patient basis' actually undermines reference pricing in the
future remains to be determined. Perhaps the latter stand-
ard can be made the subject of criteria more in accord with
the Australian mechanims of objectively demonstrated
therapeutic significance. If increasing numbers of pat-
ented pharmaceutical manufacturers are successful in
obtaining PBS F1 listing for pharmaceuticals that involve
only minor molecular alterations ('me-too' medicines),
on the basis of placebo controlled trials, that will indeed
signal that reference pricing has been traded away.
Another test of the survivability of reference pricing will
be the number of drugs that move from F1 to F2 categories
as 'incremental innovation' occurs in competitor mole-
cules and promised health outcomes, price determina-
tions and classifications are reassessed by the PBAC. What
eventually happens to Pfizer's 'blockbuster' lipitor (atorv-
astatin) may become a litmus test of whether the PBS sys-
tem, as a result of such changes, has become more
responsive to multinational corporate lobbying based onAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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valuing innovation by (distorted) market forces, rather
than the 'cost' and 'responsibility' factors by which the
National Medicines Policy orients industry renewal
towards the public health needs of Australian citizens.
The F2 category of medicines where there are many brands
listed and groups of medicines that are interchangeable
between patients and pharmacists offer price discounts to
suppliers. From 1 August 2008 a price drop of 2 per cent a
year will occur over three years for F2A medicines where
price competition between brands is low. A one-off price
drop of 25 per cent will occur for medicines categorised as
F2T where price competition between brands is high. For
a defined list of medicines, this will be phased in over
remaining patent life. Given examples of F2T medicines
are simvastatin, omeprazole, ranitidine, amoxycillin and
felodipine and around 100 other molecules currently
costing the PBS $2 billion a year. It has been suggested
that angiotensin II receptor inhibitors will not be
included, though it remains unclear whether this can be
interpreted as ad hoc policy at the behest of industry lob-
bying. Over time, the Government plans to reimburse
only the actual price at which the F2T medicine is being
sold [38]. Pharmacists have been promised compensation
of 40 cents for every script processed through OBS Online
from July 1 2007 and national full line wholesalers $69
million over three years to the Community Services Obli-
gation Funding Pool.
It is difficult to see how these new F1 and F2 categories ful-
fil any of the basic criteria of the National Medicines Pol-
icy or are in the long term interests of Australian public
health. The new F1 category clearly only benefits multina-
tional manufacturers of new patented medicines and
makes it difficult for their claims to innovation to be
tested on criteria of objectively demonstrated therapeutic
significance. The F1 PBS category is presumptively anti-
competitive and pro-monopolistic in that it shields prod-
ucts from having to prove their claims for PBS reimburse-
ment against competitors. Its continuance should be
thoroughly investigated by Australian market competition
and anti-trust regulators.
It will be critical for the practical survival of reference pric-
ing under the PBS, that new patented pharmaceuticals
continue to be listed in price groups classified (in accord
with s 101(3) of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth)) on
the basis of hard therapeutic outcomes (QALYS, for exam-
ple from blood pressure, cholesterol or gastric ulcer reduc-
tion). The F1-F2 category, in other words, is
fundamentally unsuited to allowing the PBS system to
remain responsive (in terms of equity of access and mod-
eration in public health expenditure) to expensive new
generation biologic generics and nanopharmaceuticals. It
is to be hoped that a full review of the F1-F2 changes takes
place with a view to their dismantling.
The Australian health minister admitted these F1-F2
changes did not greatly advance the interests of either
generic manufacturers or pharmacists, which, of course, is
almost an admission that they served chiefly the interest
of patented multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers,
represented by Medicines Australia.
The Generics Medicine Industry Association [GMiA] is
not, as I understand it, especially happy with these
changes... [but]... we are, as part of these changes, rul-
ing out a tendering system and I think that the whole
sector, including GMiA, should be pleased that we are
not going down the New Zealand path. The final point
I would make is that by removing the gross discounts
from the system, we should ensure that domestic
generic manufacturers are less at risk from predatory
newcomers such as some of the Indian generic drug
manufacturers [39].
Saying that the GMiA was unhappy with the proposals
was an understatement. The GMiA chairman John Mont-
gomery stated:
The reforms dismantle reference pricing, encourage
'evergreening' and provide no incentive for the use of
true generics. This flies in the face of the government's
stated aim of ensuring sustainability of the PBS...Elim-
inating the ongoing [reference] price link between pat-
ented medicines and medicines producing the same
outcome but no longer patent protected means Aus-
tralian taxpayers will be paying higher prices for essen-
tially the same health outcome...The reforms...will
undermine [PBS] fundamentals and will paradoxically
increase its costs [40].
These creation of an F1 PBS category largely conforms to
plans of the multinational brand name pharmaceutical
manufacturers and US AUSFTA negotiators to undermine
reference pricing. For this reason the interest of US repre-
sentatives in the new F1-F2 reforms manifested in the sec-
ond meeting of the AUSFTA MWG in early May 2007, may
be revealing [41]. The F1-F2 changes, however, are most
problematic for being merely the most recent in a list of
sporadic Government interventions, over the past twenty
years, designed to support the Australian pharmaceutical
industry, but failing to deliver industry renewal compara-
ble to that achieved as diversely comparable (to pick but
a few examples) as Ireland, Sweden, Canada or India (as
highlighted in the latter case, by Lofgren's article in this
issue). The temporary rejection of close-bid competitive
tendering, for example is curious. Such a tendering system
may actually have favoured a generic medicines industryAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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in Australia and certainly facilitated lower prices closer to
the marginal cost of production [42]. Tendering under the
PBS is certainly a policy worthy of reconsideration in pol-
icies designed to facilitate industry renewal in accordance
with the National Medicines Policy.
The Australian Generics Medicines Industry and Other 
Recent Reforms
On the positive side, under amendments to the Patents Act
1990 (Cth) passed on 14 September 2006, a relatively nar-
row 'springboarding' exemption (which applied only to
extended term of a patent for an active pharmaceutical
ingredient (API)) was replaced with a general exemption
to infringement of a 'brand-name' pharmaceutical patent
(defined broadly as including APIs, methods, uses and
products), for a generic seeking to get access to originator
data to develop a product prior to placing it on the market
after originator patent expiry. This 'springboarding'
amendment did not apply to medical devices (which as
we shall see, may be a significant oversight in relation to
nanotherapeutics). The Australian generic pharmaceutical
industry will undoubtedly gain some assistance for this
change.
As at early 2007, the Australian generic manufacturing
industry remained comparatively small (employing
approximately 3,000 people) and characterized increas-
ingly by cross ownership and licensing arrangements with
multinational brand name companies [43]. One of the
largest manufacturers (65% of the generics market) was
Alphapharm (parent company Merck KgaA). Shortly after
announcement of the generics-adverse 2006 PBS F1-F2
reforms, Alphapharm began negotiations for a sale of its
generics business to the Indian company Ranbaxy [44].
Eventually Alphapharm was purchased by the US generics
company Mylan Laboratories. Sigma Company, the next
largest generics manufacturer, merged in 2005 with Arrow
Pharmaceuticals, to form Sigma Pharmaceuticals [45].
Early in 2007 The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
approved Hospira's US$2 billion takeover of the Austral-
ian generics injectables manufacturer Mayne Pharma on
condition Mayne sold the rights to certain analgesics and
an iron chelating agent, to US Barr Pharmaceuticals.
Genepharm Australasia, one of the most forward thinking
local generics manufacturers, recently acquired the Aus-
tralian operations of the New Zealand-owned Douglas
Pharmaceuticals. Generic Health is also an important
local generic manufacturer with a progressive focus. Hexal
Australia is now part of Sandoz, the generics arm of the
Novartis Group, following Novartis' acquisition of
Hexal's parent company, Germany-based Hexal AG. In
2006 PharmAust announced it would be importing
generic medicines sourced in Malaysia by Xepa-Soul Patti-
son, a division of Apex Healthcare [46].
Another feature of the Australian generic pharmaceutical
industry is that less than 5 percent of sales is represented
by products made from locally manufactured active phar-
maceutical ingredients (APIs), notably those derived from
alkaloid extraction based on poppy farming in Tasmania
(operated by GlaxoSmithKline and Johnson and John-
son) and the small scale facilities of the Australian Nuclear
Science and Technology Organization and the Institute of
Drug Technology. Fully imported products or fully fin-
ished products packaged locally represent about 62 per-
cent of sales [47].
Thus, to the limited extent that any pharmaceutical man-
ufacturing is undertaken in Australia, both the generics
and the international brand companies operate relatively
small scale and low-tech operations. Adding to competi-
tion problems for the Australian generic pharmaceutical
industry is the proliferation of linkages (licensing, co-mar-
keting or distribution agreements etc) between originator
and generics firms, particularly in the form of so-called
'authorised' generics, 'pseudo' generics, or 'fighting
brands' [48]. These are not generics in the usual sense of
this term, but simply repackaged brand name products
designed to 'warn-off' competition from 'blockbusters'
whose core product patent is about to expire [49].
The extent to which government policy (or its absence)
has contributed to the relatively subdued state of the cur-
rent Australian generics pharmaceuticals industry, is
unclear. Certainly, however, such policy has not involved
forward planning, coherent with all elements of the
National Medicines Policy, to assist the Australian nano/
bio sector meet impending challenges such as those next
discussed.
Industrial Renewal: Biologic Generics
It is estimated that several hundred new 'biologic' drugs
are now in development pipelines. These include, for
example, growth hormone, insulin, granulocyte-macro-
phage colony-stimulating factor (GM-CSF), or erythropoi-
etin. Such drugs are distinctively derived from living cells
and their manufacturing companies often prefer to call
themselves 'discovery generics', to highlight the amount
of innovative research required for successful product
development of these generic products. The current
worldwide market for protein-based biotech. drugs, is
over $20 billion. Biotechnology patents increased sub-
stantially in most nations in the period 1991–2002,
including Australia (19 to 100), Canada (53–136), Swe-
den (24 to 93), US (1160 to 2342) and EU (650 to 2025).
India (3 to 28), China (0 to 49) and Ireland (6 to 7)
increased by comparatively small amounts, but achieved
the strongest gains in the most recent years [50].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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In the bio/nanopharma sector, Australia retains a leading
role in the Asia-Pacific region and ranks number sixth the
world in terms of number of firms [51]. Without careful
policy attention this positive situation may not continue.
Remove Australia's three largest biotech companies (CSL,
Cochlear and ResMed), for example, and the sector as a
whole suffered a 14.6% decline of share price in 2006 (the
NASDAQ Biotech Index falling 14.3 per cent in the same
period).
One main obstacle to generic investment in such biolog-
ics, is the difficulty in obtaining regulatory quality, safety
and efficacy approval for marketing. To achieve such mar-
keting approval, a generic 'biologic' manufacturer must
uniquely prove to a regulator use of the same protein
expression system, purification protocol, and delivery
technology as in the original patent. Unusually stringent
aseptic production techniques are required to guard
against contamination.
Safety, quality and efficacy regulators also consider that
there are significant unresolved scientific issues about
how to establish bio-equivalence between complex bio-
logical macromolecules. A protein, for example, can be
folded, glycosylated, and methylated in quite different
ways if expressed in mammalian or bacterial cultures.
Likewise, a generic monoclonal antibody may bind to the
same antigen, but through an alternate binding site and
with an altered affinity from the original antibody. All of
this may alter a product's pharmacokinetics and pharma-
codynamics from the brand name competitor. The source
material in biologic manufacturing is likewise not as read-
ily classified as involving chemicals or standard generic
pharmaceutical active product ingredients.
Most medical ethics guidelines preclude clinical trials on
a product that is demonstrably inferior to the current
standard of care. Under current regulations, as long as a
company can continue making medically significant
improvements on a therapeutic protein, it may be able to
retain an exclusive market indefinitely without having to
repeat full-scale clinical trials. Amgen appears to have
used that approach in developing an improved version of
its blockbuster treatment for anaemia, Epogen (Aranesp).
In Europe, the Schering company likewise has gained
approval for a version of interferon-alpha called PEG-
interferon alpha, in which a polyethylene glycol (PEG)
moiety increases the half-life of the protein in the body,
reducing dosing frequency.
Similarly, new generic production facilities often generate
biologics with increased purity from the original, placing
pressure on 'discovery generic' manufacturers to perform
additional clinical trials. These, through inconvenient and
a substantial additional expense, are likely to be less risky
to patients, however, than the original studies, because
the underlying principle of the drug's action has already
been proven and the clinical end point is known. Some
'biologic' manufacturers have even filed for a new patent
after significantly altering the production process. Eli
Lilly, for example, developed a new manufacturing proc-
ess for its human growth hormone and had the protein
approved as a new orphan drug (Humatrope). Overlap-
ping product patents, process patents, use patents and
purity patents are likely to spur litigation for product
exclusivity in this area [52].
Such regulatory problems contributed to the fact that, in
2004, 2005 and 2006, only 5, 2 and 4 biopharmaceuticals
respectively, were transferred from the US Center for Bio-
logics Evaluation and Research to the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research for successful biologics license
applications [53]. A proposed US Federal Access to Life-
Savings Drugs Act is intended to alleviate such problems. It
allows abbreviated approval of biological products that
share the "principal molecular structural features" of pre-
viously approved brand-name products. Approval for
pharmacy substitution is conditional on regulators
approving a biologic as a clinically "interchangeable"
product, rather than a "follow-on" (or "me-too'). The Bill
grants the secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) the extraordinary discretion
(and responsibility) of determining on a case-by-case
basis, whether additional clinical trials are required [54].
Yet, in 2006, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) fol-
lowing new guidelines, recommended approval of San-
doz's Omnitrope, a generic version of an existing growth
hormone pharmaceutical. The EMA, unlike the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has guidelines assisting
generic manufacturers wishing to market 'biogenerics'
Further, companies such as Momenta Pharmaceuticals are
utilising technologies that analyze the structure of compli-
cated sugar molecules and possibly proteins, smoothing
regulatory safety, quality and efficacy approval of these
replicant pharmaceuticals [55].
Certain geographic and political areas are racing ahead
with biologic development. In Denmark, for example,
strengths in clinical science base, management and estab-
lished indigenous pharmaceutical companies are sup-
ported by policies facilitating start up and collaborations
(for example Novo Nordisk and Leo Pharma (diabetes)
and Lundbeck (psychiatric and neurological disorders)).
A particular element in Scandinavian success in this area
may be 'Medicon Valley', (around Copenhagen and
Malmö in Sweden), which, along with Cambridge in the
UK and Basel, is one of Europe's top three biotech clusters
[56].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
Page 10 of 16
(page number not for citation purposes)
Australian pharmaceutical policy makers need to learn the
lessons of the industry renewal policies that have been
applied, or are being attempted, to achieve such results
with biologic generics. Breaking the reference pricing link-
age between 'innovative' and 'generic' drugs may not be
useful in this context.
Industrial Renewal: Pharmacogenetics
Another biopharma area where carefully organized poli-
cies, building on existing skills and facility strengths,
could promote Australian industrial renewal, is pharma-
cogenetics (the science of studying genetically-determined
responses to medicinal drugs). Based on recent UK and US
studies, about 1 in 15 admissions to Australian hospitals
are due to or involve adverse drug reactions, many of these
directly leading to adverse health outcomes [57]. Such
harmful side effects vary between individuals and range
from failure to respond therapeutically, to minor illness
and even death [58]. A few Australian companies are
already starting to invest in this area. One prominent
example is Genetic Technologies Ltd, which is licensed by
Myriad Genetics (USA) to carrying out BRCA breast cancer
genetic screening. Australia, generally, has a strong related
skills base in genetic sequencing.
Predicted developments in pharmacogenetics include (1)
recording of individual patient pharmacogenetic profiles
(2) establishment of prescribing guidelines, that will
relate dose to genotype and highlight the possibility of
adverse drug interactions (3) development of new drugs
for patients with specific genotypes (drug stratification).
This latter area could be of particular policy value in the
context of Australian biopharma industry renewal. Phar-
maceutical industry interest may extend to 'packaging'
drugs along with genetic tests and takeovers or licensing of
genetic test manufacturers [59].
The US FDA's approval of the AmpliChip CYP450 (Roche
and Affymetrix) for in vitro diagnostics represented a sig-
nificant regulatory advance for pharmacogenomics Yet, as
with 'biologicals,' regulatory changes necessary to facili-
tate uptake of (and public benefit from) such pharmaco-
genetic developments have yet to be systematically
considered by Australian health policy makers.
Privacy laws, for example, will need to mesh with the
capacity of a simple finger prick, mouth wash, or hair
sample to obtain genetic information enabling a doctor to
rapidly determine the likelihood of a drug's efficacy and
side effects. If pharmacogenetics is to minimize drug
expenditure by reducing wastage and simplify post-mar-
keting surveillance, then both Therapeutic Goods Admin-
istration (TGA) and the PBS officials will need to be
actively involved in policy development. Under defini-
tions of reference pricing prior to the F1-F2 categories, for
example, new patented drugs seeking PBS listing in con-
junction with a genetic test would still need to be evalu-
ated for comparative cost-effectiveness against existing
marketed products (without linked genetic tests). Clinical
trials are becoming increasingly expensive and pharmaco-
genetics could provide a seemingly attractive way of
reducing industry dependence on them for regulatory
approvals and post-marketing surveillance. The Novartis
Institutes of Biomedical Research has recently been pro-
moting use of biomarkers to select research subjects with
the idea of improving the efficiency of pharmaceutical
clinical trials. Despite cautious present investor interest,
linking medicines with a genetic test could facilitate valu-
able long term diversification in the Australian bio/nano-
pharma industry.
Industrial Renewal: Nanotherapeutics
Medical nanotechnology involves the development of
drug/invasive therapeutic device products controllable at
atomic, molecular or macromolecular levels of approxi-
mately 1–100 nanometers. Nanostructures have much
greater strength, stability and surface area per unit mass
than standard materials and those below 10 nm possess
quantum effects where size may control, for example, the
specific wavelength of emitted light [60].
Nanotechnology is a rapidly expanding area of medical
research and development globally.[61] Over 200 compa-
nies are actively involved in this area, viewing nanotech-
nology is having a powerful enabling function that
enhances the effectiveness and market competitiveness of
existing health technologies [62]. Peptide nanotubes, for
example, have been investigated as the next generation of
antibiotics [63] and as immune modulators [64] Nanom-
edical applications been investigated in neurosurgery
[65], cardiac surgery [66] and blood disorders [67] Most
major pharmaceutical companies have substantial invest-
ments in nanotechnology [68].
In Australia, nanomedicine is a rapidly growing industry
sector. Nanotechnology is a priority area for Australian
Research Council (ARC) funded research (A$53,013,909
in 2002–03), many collaborations being promoted by the
ARC Nanotechnology Network (ARCNN) [69]. Starp-
harma, for example, (with US-based Dendritic NanoTech-
nologies) and Australian government and US National
Institutes of Health (NIH) funding, is developing
VivaGel™ as an HIV-prevention dendrimer-based microbi-
cide gel. VivaGel™ represents bottom up nanotechnology
and involves a well-defined synthetic polymer, made by
adding monomers in a branching manner, binding to
glycoproteins on the surface of HIV and thus preventing,
in a dose-response manner, HIV binding to receptors on
T-cells. VivaGel™ is the world's first dendrimer-based drug
to be approved for human trials by US FDA (phase 1 studyAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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completed 2004). pSividia has developed Brachysil™ a
nanostructural, porosified, biosilicon platform technol-
ogy for controlled drug delivery and already have a licens-
ing agreement for it with a US company based in China.
At present, however, most regulatory concern in Australia
seems to be focused generally on the safety of nanotech-
nology, rather than on facilitating venture capital for a
nanomedicine industry systematically focused, through
good regulatory architecture, on public health outcomes.
A major concern is that highly reactive and mobile engi-
neered nanoparticles (ENPs) may present unique health
risks when used in medical applications [70]. There are
currently no effective methods to monitor ENP exposure
risks [71] Research suggests that the health risks of nanos-
tructures cannot be predicted a priori from their bulk
equivalent. In animal studies, short term exposure to
ENP's has produced dose-dependent inflammatory
responses and pulmonary fibrosis. Some engineered nan-
oparticles have also been shown to preferentially accumu-
late in mitochondria and inhibit function, others may
become unstable in biological settings and release ele-
mental metals [72].
Despite such findings, the US FDA appears to have
assumed that macroscale safety may translate to that at the
nano level [73]. A nanoparticulate reformulation of an
existing drug, for example, has been deemed by the FDA
not to require an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) because bioequivalence was established [74].
These developments suggest that the Australian govern-
ment should take a stronger long term policy interest in
public benefit-focused industry renewal in the nanothera-
peutics sector. A recent Senate Inquiry recommended cre-
ation of a working party to consider creation of a distinct,
permanent regulatory body for nanotechnology [75]. The
latter approach was taken with gene technology under the
Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth) [76]. Such a broad licens-
ing approach, encompassing regulatory industrial, agri-
cultural and therapeutic applications may not be the best
vehicle for encouraging renewal in the uniquely complex
Australian bio/nanopharma sector.
Appropriate regulatory changes could favour the develop-
ment of a biopharma industry where existing off-patent
products are re-badged to become more profitable with a
more effective nano-based delivery system. On the other
hand, hasty regulatory approval of nano-versions of exist-
ing drugs (as is the case with generic 'biologicals') could
place expenditure burdens of public health systems and
risk damage to public health. In this context, given the
presumptive claims that nanomedicine manufacturers
will make for reimbursement reward of their 'innovation',
the maintenance of a robust system of PBS reference pric-
ing will be critical to ensuring that the Australian public
obtains value for its nanomedicine expenditure. A recent
European Science Foundation report recommends that
the flexible enabling functions of nanotechnology in
medical applications may be lost if coordinated policies
facilitating investment and efficient regulation are not
developed [77]. One of the best models for facilitating
community value from nanotechnology research may be
the Nanotechnology Victoria (Nanovic) consortium (Uni-
versities of Melbourne, Swinburne and RMIT with the
CSIRO) receiving start-up funding from the Victorian
Government [78].
Sustainable Industrial Renewal and Global Public Goods
Global public goods (increasingly defined in global regu-
latory debate in a broader sense than under traditional
economic theory) provide benefits from which no indi-
vidual should be excluded. They span national, cultural
and generational boundaries, their consumption theoret-
ically not creating rivalry. Some are 'merit goods' in the
sense that their promotion and protection supports values
such as justice and equity, as well as international human
rights, and requires that contrary influences emerging
from pro-monopolistic markets be overridden. Examples
of global public goods include not only clean air, peaceful
societies, control of communicable disease, transport and
law and order infrastructure, but systems of universal (tax-
payer-funded) health care and pharmaceutical research
and development oriented by percentage GDP prize funds
towards the global burden of illness. Some of these
require international co-operation for their production
(particularly safety and cost-effectiveness evaluation of
new health technologies). Emphasis upon such goods
highlights the need to seriously consider sustainability in
the regulatory architecture of markets.
Affordable access to essential medicines is increasingly
recognised as a global public good, providing an essential
precondition to a reasonable quality of life for a signifi-
cant proportion of every human population, being sys-
tematically underprovided by private market forces and
imposing burdensome international externality costs on
third parties [79]. Further, affordable access to essential
medicines appears to be emerging, both academically and
in practise, as a core part of the international right to
health in article 12 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Cultural and Social Rights (article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights). One recent manifestation
was the Doha Declaration, which affirmed the capacity of
WTO members to use to the full exceptions in the Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement ("TRIPS")
to promote public health by facilitating access to afforda-
ble medicines [80]. It is also specifically referred to in arti-
cle 14 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights [81].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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Global public goods, both in general and as directly
related to the bio/nanopharma sector, in the immediate
future, will have to be financed at the national level, with
sector specific incentives. This will probably remain the
case, at least until universal threats such as bioterrorism,
emergent infectious disease and climate change, create
sufficient political will for reform of world governance
structures This may particularly be so if the claims of inno-
vation by such technologies are undermined by their
largely unaccountable expense [82]. Safety and cost-effec-
tiveness evaluation of health technologies is one global
public good that would benefit greatly from improved
financial and administrative co-operation between
nations, linked with enhanced democratic involvement
[83]. Reference pricing provides a crucial mechanism in
this context, by encouraging a market focus on objectively
demonstrated improvements in health outcomes. Fortu-
nately, Australia's National Medicines Policy has already
established aims broadly in accord with this public goods
focus on industrial renewal.
One specific strategy is for public goods-focused research-
ers to incrementally innovate patented drug molecules
and, by institutionally treating the new patent as a public
good, make the product available cheaply to poor patients
in the developing world. This is an approach that if sup-
ported by appropriate policy, might greatly enhance the
commercial prospects of companies in the Australia bio/
nanopharma sector.
English medical researchers for example, recently rede-
signed an effective but extremely expensive Roche drug for
hepatitis C, called pegylated interferon, so that its large
sugar molecule (which increased its half life) on the
inside, rather than the outside. The Shantha corporation
in Hyderabad, which had made the world's first cost-effec-
tive hepatitis B vaccine (and was already making the orig-
inal interferon), agreed to make the new medicine with
the Indian government subsidising the necessary pre reg-
ulatory approval clinical trials. The UK scientists are also
working on an innovative 'ethical pharmaceutical' for vis-
ceral leishmaniasis (kala-azar), a fatal disease in Brazil,
Bangladesh, India and the Sudan transmitted by sandflies
[84].
Industrial renewal in the Australian pharmaceutical
industry will not occur without robust competition
between manufacturers and ingredient suppliers in a reg-
ulatory environment that favours public goods. This being
so, the lack of interest shown by the existing Australian
generic pharmaceutical sector in the China-Australia Free
Trade Agreement is remarkable.
China is one of the world's largest manufacturers of
generic pharmaceuticals. In 2001, the sales income of
China's (largely generic) pharmaceutical industry totalled
US$21 billion [85]. China's pharmaceutical market aver-
ages 18–20% growth over the last twenty years, signifi-
cantly higher than US and European growth over the same
period. By 2020, China will have the world's largest phar-
maceutical market.
The Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework was
signed during the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao in
October 2003. This Framework sets the direction for the
trade and economic relationship in the long term and
included a commitment to conclude a Free Trade Agree-
ment feasibility study by 31 October 2005. Its purpose is
to enhance trade, investment and economic cooperation
and build on Australia's commercial relations with China
in a number of key sectors. It also commits the parties to
further trade liberalisation.
One of the most common models for pharmaceutical
development in China involves joint ventures with local
partners facilitating regulatory approval and market share.
China currently produces over 1,350 medicines in 24
classes. Almost all these are what may be described as
"generic" drugs. In recent years, China has patented only
two brand name or 'innovative' drugs (arteannuin and
sodium dimercaptosuccinate) that have received interna-
tional marketing approval. Yet China has strong ambi-
tions in the innovative drug field, being hampered only by
a present lack of access to drug design and regulatory
expertise such as that possessed to a level of international
excellence by Australia.
China acceded to the WTO on December 11 2001. In
doing so, China agreed to restructure its domestic legal
system to, amongst other things, comply with the obliga-
tions of the WTO TRIPS agreement. Late in 2002, a year
after its accession to the WTO and agreement to abide by
TRIPS, China passed its Measures for the Administration of
Pharmaceutical Registration (for Trial Implementation) and
Implementing Regulations for the Law of the People's republic
of China for the Administration of Pharmaceuticals. Under
these laws, once a pharmaceutical has been approved for
domestic production the State Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (SFDA) will not permit other companies to pro-
duce or import it for "monitoring periods" of 3–5 years.
The chief purpose of these "monitoring periods" is to
check for side effects, but of course it also accords a valu-
able period of market exclusivity. A 'generic' manufacturer
seeking market entry makes an application to provincial
drug authorities, who arrange on-site testing of samples.
The SFDA will then conduct a comprehensive review,
before deciding whether to issue a Pharmaceutical Pro-
duction Permit. The procedure is similar for the issuing of
a Pharmaceutical Processing and Export Approval Docu-
ment.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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When interviewed as part of an Australian Research Coun-
cil grant in 2005, senior representatives of the generic
pharmaceutical industry in Australia appeared concerned
to deny market access to Chinese products, ostensibly on
safety and quality grounds. This cannot be a sustainable
regulatory ambition, as the Chinese generic industry
develops and is unlikely to be in the long term national
interest of the Australian public. China is emerging as a
great potential market for Australian biotech and nan-
otech pharmaceuticals. pSivida Ltd, for example, an Aus-
tralian listed public company with a substantial
shareholding in pSiMedica Ltd (UK), has patented in
China its nanotech silicon drug delivery system (BioSili-
con™). The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement offers
Australia an opportunity to share its pre-eminent regula-
tory strengths in safety, quality, efficacy (through the
TGA) and cost -effectiveness analysis (via the PBAC) with
China, in return for enhanced access for its bio/nanop-
harma products to the Chinese market. In time this could
become a stepping stone to a multilateral treaty on safety
and cost-effectiveness assessment of new health technolo-
gies [86]. This background makes it remarkable then that
discussion about generic pharmaceuticals appears not
even to have been raised as a topic of discussion in nego-
tiations related to the China-Australia Free Trade Agree-
ment [87].
Recent obligations acquired under the Australia-US Free
Trade Agreement (AUSTFA) may play a problematic role
in the process of industrial renewal in the Australian bio/
nanopharma sector. So-called 'Fast Track' provisions
require discussion between the US FDA and the Australian
TGA about making "innovative" pharmaceutical products
more speedily available (Annex 2C.4). It remains contro-
versial whether these will be carved out from the New Zea-
land obligations under the proposed Australia-New
Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency [88]. There are also
obligations acquired under the AUSTFA requiring 'valu-
ing' of pharmaceutical "innovation" through either the
operation of "competitive markets" (the US position,
requiring an enhanced role for competition and anti-trust
regulators) or "objectively demonstrated therapeutic sig-
nificance" (the Australian position, supporting an
enhanced role for the PBAC in ensuring that the PBS
expenditure on new PBS-listed products is commensurate
with evidence-based assessments of their comparative
community value and cost of development) (Annex
2C.1)[89]. The "generic" (rather than "innovative") status
of biologic and nanoparticulate versions of off-patent
drugs will be particularly difficult to assess [90].
South Korean negotiators of the Korea-US Free Trade
Agreement (KORUSFTA) appear to have taken a much
stronger stance in favour of their emerging biologic gener-
ics industry [91]. The South Korean government was so
impressed by the socially and scientifically sound eco-
nomic incentives offered by Australian PBS evidence-
based cost-effectiveness and reference pricing system, that
article 5.2 of the KORUSFTA permitted South Korea to
establish a PBS-like reimbursement system for pharma-
ceuticals or medical devices where the amount paid was
not based on 'competitive market-derived prices'. That
article indicated that if it did so, then amongst other
things, it had to 'appropriately recognise the value of pat-
ented pharmaceutical products' (article 5.2 (b) (i)). Arti-
cle 5.1 (c) and (e) respectively echoed PBAC-type
evidence-based pharmcoeconomic analysis by referring to
'sound economic incentives' as a method of facilitating
access to patented medicines and 'transparent and
accountable' procedures as a means of promoting innova-
tion [92].
A major report in the UK has also recommended the PBS
evidence-based cost-effectiveness system linked to a cen-
tral government price negotiation as a model for that
nation [93]. Interest is gathering in the US for a similar
linkage of health technology cost effectiveness analysis
with central government price negotiation [94].
Biosecurity is also an important global public good with
important connections to the biopharma sector. At the
time of the anthrax biosecurity threat in the US, it became
clear that protection of the population in many developed
nations may be crucially dependent on the capacity of
generic manufacturers to rapidly increase and stockpile
necessary pharmaceuticals, if necessary under a compul-
sory license (Thailand, for example, recently confirmed it
would issue compulsory licences permitted under the
WTO TRIPS agreement, to buy generic versions of Sanofi-
Aventis' anti-blood clotting pharmaceutical Plavix and
Abbott's anti-HIV/AIDS medicine Kaletra).
As the Australian pharmaceutical industry increasingly
researches biologic products, these may (rarely) produce
unintended outcomes that create biosecurity implica-
tions. An example is the unintended development of a
highly virulent and dangerous mousepox IL-4 [95] or bot-
ulinum in milk [96].
In 2005, scientists from the US Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology published the full sequence of the highly viru-
lent strain of influenza virus that caused the Spanish influ-
enza pandemic in the winter of 1918–1919 and killed up
to 50 million people worldwide [97]. Further work based
on the sequence led to the synthesis of an influenza strain
which showed a high virulence and mortality rate when
tested in mice [98]. Such developments confirm that
recent developments in genetics, genomics and other
areas of pharmaceutical development might (intention-
ally or unintentionally) create biosecurity hazards [99]. AAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/9
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National Centre for Biosecurity (NCB) has been estab-
lished at the Australian National University to coordinate
scientific, legal and policy expertise in this area.
The capacity of Australia to respond to a natural disaster
or bioterrorist threat may crucially depend on our capacity
to increase supply of blood and blood products. The on-
shore capacity of the Commonwealth Serum laboratories
(CSL) Pty Ltd is likely to play a crucial role in such a rapid
response situation. Continuance of the CSL monopoly in
this area has been challenged by an AUSFTA side-letter
that creates a mechanism for opening up the area for com-
petitive tender [100]. It will also depend upon Australia
possessing a sophisticated local generic manufacturing
capacity capable of responding to a compulsory license in
a national emergency.
The Commonwealth Government Review of Australia's
Plasma Fractionation Arrangements, after an exhaustive
study of European and US arrangements, concluded that
overseas fractionation of Australian plasma would involve
significant transitional costs ($A75million) and because
of yield considerations, there would be the potential for
an ongoing shortfall in the supply of IVIg and other
plasma derived products. The Review also found major
potential supply chain risks in overseas fractionation. The
Review recommended that the Federal government main-
tain the reservation exempting plasma fractionation serv-
ices from the government procurement provisions of
Chapter 15 of the AUSFTA. It recommended that the Fed-
eral government support CSL Bioplasma in this area in
part because of the crucial role that company could play
in Australia's biotech industry renewal [101]. In coming
to such conclusions the review undoubtedly assisted to
focus industrial renewal in this sector not only on positive
public health outcomes, but public goods-supporting
processes.
Conclusion
The potential strengths of the Australian bio/nanopharma
sector may be summarised as: (1) high levels of skills and
expertise in basic medical research and healthcare in Aus-
tralia. (2) excellent clinical and medical training programs
and hospital/health infrastructure, well integrated with
basic medical R&D institutes. (3) strong continuing sup-
port by Government for medical research through the
National Health and Medical Research Council
(NH&MRC). (4) high levels of expertise in pharmaceuti-
cal regulation (5) excellent capability in critical new
knowledge areas and platform technologies: biologics,
genomics, bio-informatics, nanotechnology and fast
screening [102]. Australia possesses at least three centres
with expertise in conducting Phase I pharmaceutical clin-
ical trials [103].
This article has examined the proposition that Australian
medicines policy has not been sufficiently supportive of a
high value-added generics industry, or mechanisms facili-
tating that such as PBS reference pricing. It has argued that
such policy has not involved a systematic plan for sustain-
able industrial renewal of the Australian bio/nanopharma
sector in the context of the challenges such as 'biologics,'
nanotherapeutics, pharmacogenetics, more globalised
health technology regulatory assessment and biosecurity.
It has shown made a reasonable case that the principles of
the National Medicines Policy have not been consistently
applied in this context and that the integration therein of
extra-patent reward of innovation needs to be more sys-
tematically evaluated.
There is presently a critical window to shape the regula-
tory architecture for sustainable industrial renewal in the
Australian bio/nanopharma industry. Australia for the
time being, though having some cost disadvantages rela-
tive to comparable economies, has several non-cost
advantages particularly in its skills base and safety and
cost-effectiveness regulatory systems. The crucial policy
task, over the next decade, may be to identify the critical
high-efficiency niche bio/nanotech. production areas that
should be consistently and systematically encouraged to
meet the specific long term goals of the Australian people.
In this respect, the venture capital evolution of a public-
consortia model such as 'Nanovic' may present significant
advantages. So too may, the retention and strengthening
of PBS reference pricing as an important fiscal lever that
promotes genuine and sustainable market competition, as
well as Australia's promotion in international fora of a
health technology safety and cost-effectiveness assess-
ment treaty. It cannot be assumed that the long term inter-
ests of all Australian citizens and the goals of
multinational corporate interests in the presently consti-
tuted patented pharmaceutical sector, will long coincide.
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